The Q&A meeting is cancelled simply because Russian people are tired of it. Since 2015, its rating drops:

  • 2015 - 12.2%
  • 2016 - 10.3%
  • 2017 - 8.9%
  • 2018 - 8.3%
  • 2019 - 7.6%

In 2020, it was cancelled. In 2021, its rating was not published, probably because it was low. In 2022, it was cancelled again.

— edited by blednotik

@(Jgalt) 1. Russian economics is very hard to sanction. With its population of 140M, Russia can provide itself with food and energy. Its main exports are [fuels, metals, grains, and fertilizers](https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus?depthSelector1=HS4Depth). It is hard to put embargo on these, at least in short term (up to one year). Put an embargo on oil, and Russia still can sell it to Asian countries at a discount. Impose a gas embargo, and [your economy will suffer](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/29/europes-plans-to-replace-russian-gas-are-deeme...

@exmateriae forecasters are supposed to update their predictions whenever there is a new information.

The official GDP was $1.65 trn in 2021.

It will shrink in 2022 by 10-15% by different estimates, so it will be 1.45-1.5 trn. The current estimate of $1.14 is too small.

  1. Is it true that Russia paid Eurobond in rubles?
  2. If Russia paid Eurobond in rubles, does it qualify as a default?
  3. If not, does it mean that Russia can pay any debt in rubles without it being considered as a default?
  4. If not, then which debts it may pay in rubles?

— edited by blednotik

Making probability distributions for quantative questions is hard.

I would suggest that the user would be able to make as many points as they want, and specify cumulative probability for each point, with the choice of linear or spline interpolation between them.

Besides, even if the user chooses to do it as now, he should be able to cut off the distribution at some point, making it zero below or above it.

It is not clear how much of the $40bln bill counts as an aid for Ukraine during the 2022 fiscal year, since most of this money will not be delivered to Ukraine, and part of this money is long-term. Below is the composition ([source](https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-40-billion-aid-ukraine-buy)) * $6 billion for a direct military assistance to Ukraine (Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative) * $9 billion for replenishment of U.S. weapons stocks. The amount is nearly three times the stated cost of equipment drawdown provided to date ($3.3 billio...
**North Korea**: In 2021, North Korea had sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (40-50, as stated in the [in the report](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/)). In 2022, it had enough materials for 50 nuclear warheads (45-55 in the report). To meet the criterion, the number rounded to the nearest 5 should increase to 60. I estimate the likelihood of this happening at **20%**. **Israel**: Israel currently has 90 warheads. To increase its stockpile by 25%, it needs at least 115 warheads. Israel achieved 80 warheads in 20...

The last FAS estimate for China,published in March 2023, is 410. It is unlikely that they will publish another estimate, as they generally don't publish two estimates in the same year.

__*My prediction: 1%*__ No country left NATO for the 73 years it exists. If a prior probability that no country leaves NATO in any given year is uniformly distributed, the posterior probability is distributed as \( \rho(p) = 74 p^{73} \) . The probability that any country leaves NATO in the next 1.5 years is \[ 1 - { \int p^{73} p^{1.5} dp \over \int p^{73}dp } \], which is 1.5/75.5, or about 0.02. However, in order to leave NATO, a country must inform the United States that it wants to leave, and then after a year it formally leaves. This narrows ...
** Correction: my prediction: 96% ** Now when Russians withdraw troops from around Kiev and Chernihiv, there are those possibilities for Zelenski to stop being a president till the end of 2022. 1. Natural death. At the age of 44, the annual risk is 0.3% (in developed countries) according to actuarial tables. Besides, people dying that young probably posess risk factors. Zelensky has no visible risk factors: he is not obese, he does not smoke, there is no alcohol abuse as far as we know. We don't know how much it decreases the expected mortality, but...
@(tryingToPredictFuture) If Navalny became the president of Russia today, he would publicly state that the Putin's decision to invade Ukraine was a crime (100%), withdraw from all the territories occupied in 2022+ (99%), from DPR and LPR (90%), and maybe from Crimea (50%). On 2/22/2022, Navalny correctly predicted that Putin was about to invade Ukraine and compared it to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he considered criminal and disastrous ([link](https://meduza.io/news/2022/02/22/i-tem-i-etim-nuzhno-odno-otvlechenie-vnimaniya-ot-realnyh-p...

Some refugees decided to return back to Ukraine. Do they count?

June 29: [Turkey’s justice minister says Ankara is seeking the extradition of 12 suspects from Finland and 21 from Sweden, according to state media.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/29/turkey-extraditions-finland-sweden) June 30: [Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said Finland and Sweden must keep their promises made to Turkey in a deal to lift its veto on their NATO membership bids or ratification will not be sent to the Turkish parliament.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/erdogan-calls-on-sweden-finland-to-fulfill-nato-deal-pro...
***My prediction: 73-77.*** Putin's popularity in January to October 2022 was 69, 71, 83, 82, 83, 83, 83, 83, 77, 79. In March, he gained 12 points for invading Ukraine, after the Russian TV whipped up the anti-Ukrainian war hysteria for many years. In September, he lost 6 points for mobilization and possibly for defeat in Kharkiv oblast. In October, he gained 2 points for ending mobilization, besides, people started to forget about the September defeat. In November-December, he is going to lose about 4 points for Kherson. New significant defeats ...

Since the question does not specify whether the Freedom of Russia Legion (Legion "Svoboda Rossii") is Ukrainian forces or not, IMHO the question should not be resolved till the resolution date (1.1.2024). Unless either "undoubtedly Ukrainian forces" will enter Russia, or Ukrainian officials will admit that FoRL is a part of Ukrainian forces, the question should be resolved ambiguously.

Since there is no way to get a reliable information on how many civilians had been killed in this city, and the estimates vary, this question should be resolved as ambiguous.

If nine months from now they're still stuck in the lines where they are now

Actually, Ukrainians released big territories in Kharkiv oblast and in Kherson oblast, including the Kherson itself. Totally it was as much as 14,000 sq.km. It seems Francis Fukuyama either doesn't know the basic facts, or chooses to ignore them.